Gun Violence Prevention:

A Study of Program Options from Twelve U.S. Cities

By Gerry Strathman, Director

I. Introduction

Despite recent reductions in gun violence, people in Saint Paul, indeed throughout the nation, remain concerned. This drop in gun violence is evidenced by Saint Paul statistics, where there were 12 homicides for the first six months of this year, 5 fewer than last year at this time. Reports of gun shots fired for the first six months of this year are down 32%; and aggravated assaults with a firearm are down 20% from last year. The statistics on the pages two and three tell a part of this story.

On April 2, 1997 the Saint Paul City Council directed Council Research through resolution (CF#97-340) to study how other cities are combating gun violence and report on their successes. This information will guide the Council in its deliberations on gun violence prevention in Saint Paul. This study is intended to provide information and analysis about what we and twelve other cities are doing. Nearly every community in the United States has confronted these issues, and yet little is known about program effectiveness at preventing gun violence. However, we do know that police and community organizations believe that violence, and gun violence in particular, results from the combination of gangs, drugs and guns. Therefore, most of the programs developed combat at least one of these elements.

There were several steps in Council Research's process to review research on other cities' gun violence prevention programs and their success at reducing gun violence. First, an extensive search and a review of available literature were conducted. When evaluations of gun violence programs were available, the results were reviewed and follow-up interviews were conducted with staff in those cities. The evaluations are especially important because they provide the only documentation for program success or failure. Additionally, Council Research developed profiles of gun violence prevention activities undertaken by police and community organizations in the cities contacted. Through the research process it became apparent that focus, communication, and the willingness to move away from unsuccessful efforts were vital. Therefore, we also examined these cities' strategies, organization and self-assessment efforts.

Gun Violence Statistics

Gun Violence Throughout the World

In 1992, handguns caused the deaths of 97 in Switzerland, 60 in Japan, 128 in Canada, 33 in Great Britain, 36 people in Sweden and 13 in Australia; compared to 13,220 people in the United States.¹

Gun Violence in the United States

There are more than 211 million firearms in the possession of private citizens in the United States, 71 million of which are handguns.²

In 1994, nearly 40% of NYC youths between the ages of 12 and 21 admitted to having carried a gun at some point in their lives.³

Black youths ages 15 to 19 are 50% more likely to be victims of murder than white youths. Firearms are the leading cause of homicidal death among black teens in this country.³

About 500 children and adolescents are killed in firearms accidents each year, many with their parents' guns.⁴

Gun Violence in Minnesota

In 1995 there were 1,978 arrests for gun-related offenses in Minnesota.⁵

The New York Times reported that Minneapolis had a record of 97 murders in 1995, 50% higher than in each of the past four years. Its murder rate of 27.1 per 100,000 people gave Minneapolis a murder rate almost 70% higher than New York City's rate of 16 per 100,000. The United States average is about 9 per 100,000.⁷ Fortunately, the murder rate in Minneapolis has dropped off significantly in the last year.

In 1995, Minnesota had approximately 1.8% of the U.S. population, but only 0.8% of the nation's homicides and 0.7% of the nation's aggravated assaults were committed here.⁹

Minnesota and U.S. Statistics for 1995 and 1996

	U.S. 19951	Minnesota 19956	Minnesota 19969	Minnesota % Change
Homicides	21,597	183	168	-8%
Homicide with Firearm	13,673	108	96	-13%
Aggravated Assault	1,099,1	7,876	7,931	1%
Aggravated Assault with Firearm	251,712	1,978	1,952	-1%

Gun Violence in Saint Paul

The first six months of 1997 has seen a significant decrease in three of the four violent crime indicators examined: homicides down 29%, aggravated assault with a firearm down 19%, shots fired reported down 32%. The only indicator to increase slightly was possession of a firearm which went up 4%.

Of the 25 homicides in Saint Paul in 1995, 18 involved firearms. Six of the City's homicides were in the Western District Area, 5 in the Central District Area, and 7 in the Eastern District Area. There were 5 knife homicides and 2 "all other" homicides. Eighteen of the homicide victims were males and 7 were females. Six of the homicides were White, 15 were Black, 3 were Asian and 1 was Hispanic.⁶

In 1996, the Saint Paul Police Department received 454 reports of "shots fired."⁸ The first six months of 1997 saw a 32% decrease in reports of shots fired over the first six months of 1996.

In 1996, 634 guns were recovered in the City of St. Paul. Guns were used in 323 assaults, 327 robberies, and 12 homicides in St. Paul in 1996. In the same year there were 196 reported incidents of juveniles in possession of an assault weapon/firearm.⁸

First 6-Month Statistics for 1996 and 1997¹⁰

	Saint Paul 1/1/96 - 7/1/96	Saint Paul 1/1/97 - 7/1/97	% Change
Homicides	17	12	-29%
Aggravated Assault with Firearm	150	121	-19%
Illegal Possession of Firearm	104	108	4%
Shots Fired Reports	238	163	-32%

1. FBI Uniform Crime Reports and National Center for Health Statistics, 1995.

2. Department of Treasury. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. (As reported by the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. Washington, D.C.)

3. Fairstein, Linda. "Guns at Home, Guns on the Street." New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law. Vol. 15, #2 and #3, 1995.

4. Witkin, Gordon. "Can 'smart' guns save many lives?" U. S. News and World Report. December 2, 1996, 37-8.

5. Minnesota Crime Information, 1995. Minnesota Dept. Of Public Safety, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Criminal Justice Information Systems.

6. 1995 Crime Report: Saint Paul Police Department. St. Paul Police Department Research & Development.

7. New York Times, June 30, 1996, p A1.

8. Ramsey County Gun Violence Action Team.

9. Karen Leatherman, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.

10. Saint Paul Police Department Research and Development 

II. Gun Violence Prevention in Other Cities

In this section of the report we will review the gun violence prevention activities undertaken by other cities. Twelve cities are discussed in alphabetical order. The discussion will focus on those program efforts which are unique to the individual cities and are being replicated by other cities because they are perceived to be successful. A table indicating the activities for which we have documentation appears in Appendix A. This is followed by a glossary of terms and program types in Appendix B.

Boston, Massachusetts

A. The Boston Strategy

Throughout the nation, Boston has become respected for its approach to gun violence prevention. Indeed, the statistics support the idea that Boston is doing something right. Violent crime is at a 32-year low and the city experienced the lowest number of homicides in decades--59--none of whom were juveniles.⁽¹⁾ 

"The foundation of Boston's approach has been the building of coalitions and partnerships among police, prosecutors, probation officers, correction officials, youth and social service personnel, judges, health professionals, parents and the young people of Boston . . . I am impressed by their efforts." -- Attorney General Janet Reno⁽²⁾ 

As Attorney General Reno indicates, one key to the Boston strategy is partnerships. But equally important is the shared vision of what needs to happen. A group of approximately 400 stakeholders participated in the development of the Strategic Plan for Neighborhood Policing. In the development of this plan, municipal, county, state and federal law enforcement were present, as well as representatives of most sectors of the Boston community. The result of this shared development of a strategic plan is a shared understanding--community-wide--of what the focus of activities needs to be. While this may sound self-evident, many community organizations and the different levels of law enforcement throughout the nation often have different, if not competing, views of what the priority actions should be taken to reduce gun violence. Additionally, the pooling of these resources is believed to increase their potential impact. Central to Boston's neighborhood police approach is the understood necessity to reduce juvenile gun violence. The Boston Police Department uses three strategies to achieve this end: intervention, enforcement and prevention. They focus on both potential juvenile victims and perpetrators of crime.

B. Intervention and Prevention Programs

In order to implement its Strategic Plan for Neighborhood Policing, the Boston Police Department has developed eleven partnerships under the auspices of its Safe Neighborhood Initiative which is designed to identify, prioritize and solve neighborhood and crime-related problems. These partnerships aim to 1) intervene in violent situations or situations that will lead to violence; and 2) prevent situations that lead to violence. The partnerships between the Police Department and other segments of the community are listed below.

1. Safe Neighborhood Tip Line -- anonymous crime-reporting telephone number.

2. Child Witness to Violence Project -- train officers to recognize the impact on children of witnessing violence and to train officers to follow-up with appropriate referrals to pediatricians, social services, etc.

3. Supervised domestic violence training as part of court sentencing.

4. Vietnamese-Police Collaborative to Reduce Crime Victimization -- organized Vietnamese Residents Advisory Council to identify, prioritize and solve problems.

5. Community Prosecutions -- collaborative of community and prosecutors on priority community problems.

6. Boston Violence Prevention Program -- coordinates education and networking efforts, works with hospitals in their efforts to treat juvenile victims of violence.

7. Summer of Opportunity -- employment and higher education opportunities for youth recommended by police officers. 8. Partnership in the Boston Coalition --business, religious, media and law enforcement group formed seven years ago to combat drugs and violence in Boston.

9. Boston Bar Association -- educational efforts.

10. Ten Point Coalition -- ecumenical group working on youth and youth violence issues.

11. Operation Safe Home -- HUD anti-crime program for public housing.

12. Youth Service Providers Network -- youth service providers and police from the larger metropolitan area who work together to facilitate cross-agency case management of youth with whom the police come into contact by use of a social worker at the police department.

13. Alternatives to Incarceration Network -- provides for the diversion of first-time youth offenders who would otherwise be incarcerated. These youth are subject to significantly increased law enforcement scrutiny and enrolled in appropriate educational, training and rehabilitation programs.

C. Enforcement Programs

1. Youth Violence Strike Force

Boston's Youth Violence Strike Force is a version of what many localities call a "gang unit" within their police department, as well as working on problem drug properties, like Saint Paul's FORCE program. The Strike Force is comprised of 45 full-time Boston police officers and 15 officers from outside agencies, such as the state police, federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, corrections and parole. The Strike Force focuses on areas of the City where youth crime is prevalent.

2. Operation Cease Fire

Operation Cease Fire is an effort by the Boston Police Department to decrease gang violence consistent with the "zero tolerance" for violence policy articulated by the community in the Strategic Plan for Neighborhood Policing. Operation Cease Fire involves meetings including local officials, police and gang leaders. The gangs are informed of the zero tolerance policy and the consequences for violating it. After these meetings, enforcement efforts in the affected areas are increased by vigorously enforcing graffiti, truancy, noise and public drinking laws.

3. Operation Night Light

Operation Night Light is the name given to the new collaboration between the Boston Police Department and probation officers. In this effort, police and probation officers make nightly visits to the homes of juvenile probationers to ensure that they are complying with the terms of their probation. This approach is intended to send the message that no probation violations will be permitted, and parents, schools and peers will be aware of the seriousness of probation conditions. Operation Night Light has been touted as a particularly successful effort at decreasing juvenile violence in the community. "One probation officer has commented that from 1990 to 1994, 68 of his youthful clients had been murdered. Since 1995, when the program was implemented, he reports that three of his clients have been murdered."⁽³⁾

4. The Boston Gun Project

The Boston Gun Project involves learning more about the supply of guns used in crimes, or guns confiscated in the course of "regular" police work. There are two primary activities in this project. First, suspects are debriefed about where they got the guns they used. Second, the Police Department traces guns using the resources and records of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). This type of effort is used in tracking down drug suppliers, and will hopefully lead to the identification of illegal gun dealers.

Charleston, South Carolina

A. Teen Court

Teen court is constructed to provide an early intervention peer court where teens try first-time juvenile offenders of nonviolent crimes; i.e., shoplifting, vandalism, etc. These cases are diverted from district court with the parents consent. High school students volunteer to be judges, attorneys, clerks of court and bailiffs. They are trained by volunteers from the South Carolina Bar Association. Juvenile offenders diverted to Teen Court are subject to up to 50 hours of community service and fines not to exceed $500. Proponents of Teen Court argue that it provides several benefits both to the juvenile offenders and the court volunteers: 

1. Provides an alternative to Juvenile Family Court;

2. Familiarizes youth with the judicial process and consequences of their illegal behavior;

3. Offers youth the opportunity to experience consequences of their illegal behavior without having a court record; and

4. Provides an opportunity for students interested in law careers to participate in the legal process.⁽⁴⁾

The Charleston Teen Court conducts approximately four sessions per month, with a maximum of five cases per session.

B. Operation Midnight

Operation Midnight is Charleston's curfew program. It provides a mechanism for parents to register their children with the Police Department as participants in the Operation Midnight Program. Participation in the program means that if the children are on the streets between 12:00 and 6:00 a.m., and picked up by police, they will be brought home. Operation Midnight is designed to not only prevent youth from being perpetrators of crime, but also victims of crime. This program was established because of the potential curfew ordinances have for being held unconstitutional.

C. Truancy Program

Like Operation Midnight, the Truancy Program picks up all youth between the ages of 6 and 17 who are on the streets when they should not be, in this case between 8:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. The youth are returned directly to the school they should be attending and parents receive a notification letter of the incident from the police. The Charleston Police Chief, Reuben Greenberg, credits this program with a 24% permanent decrease in the level of daytime crime.⁽⁵⁾

D. Gun Stoppers

Gun Stoppers is a program that provides a $100 reward, provided through private donations, to callers identifying people carrying guns. The Gun Stoppers program targets three situations: 1) people carrying guns on school grounds and playgrounds; 2) people carrying guns on the street, in taverns or bars; and 3) known drug dealers. Police Chief Greenberg of Charleston states that in 95% of the calls to the tip-line, the person in possession of a gun in a public place is identified by name.⁵ Professor Alfred Blumstein of Carnegie Mellon University states that this type of program tends to discourage youngsters from brandishing guns in public.⁽⁶⁾

Chicago, Illinois

A. Violence Prevention Yellow Pages

The Violence Prevention Yellow Pages is a directory that catalogues hundreds of Chicago-area services, ranging from male-aggression discussion groups to tattoo-removal programs that help former gang members get rid of gang symbols. It was developed by a group of doctors at Cook County Hospital, led by the director of the trauma unit, who formed the core of the Chicago Area Violence Prevention Program.⁽⁷⁾ The group remarked that they continually saw the same people coming in the trauma center as patients, and these people were not getting connected to prevention programs that the doctors knew were available. Therefore, they decided that one of the important roles they could play was to provide referrals, and make the directory available to a wide range of violence prevention programs so they could better coordinate their services.

B. Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS)

Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was initiated in April 1993. It is based on policing small geographic areas and assigning police officers to beat teams to identify and deal with a broad range of neighborhood problems in partnership with residents and community organizations.⁽⁸⁾ It has been expanded gradually since its inception, and is now a city-wide program. Perhaps the most important thing about CAPS from the perspective of Saint Paul is that it has been evaluated each year as to its effectiveness. The annual evaluations have been paid for by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the National Institute of Justice. They were undertaken by researchers from a consortium of Chicago-area universities, including Northwestern, Loyola, DePaul and the University of Illinois at Chicago.

The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy has eight components which appear below.

1. District Advisory Committee -- community-based committees are in each police district to assist the district commander in identifying and addressing district-level crime and disorder problems, as well as some of the underlying causes of crime and conditions in the neighborhood.

2. Community Partnerships -- these partnerships are the relationships between individual or groups of citizens and the district's beat cops which are developed through beat community meetings and other interactions.

3. Beat Integrity -- beat integrity is a phrase used to describe the assignment of beat officers to an area, those officers spending most of their tour of duty in that area, and answering calls for service within that area. If the officer is out of the district or "off the beat," then beat integrity is compromised. Beats are the small geographic areas to which an officer is assigned to identify and deal with a broad range of problems. Not surprisingly, the increased focus of officers on their beat has required that part of the burden of responding to 911 calls was shifted to rapid response teams and tactical units.

4. City Services -- a system that has been established whereby officers identifying a city service need on their beat can contact the relevant department to address the need. For example, if a City stop sign is damaged, the officer would be expected to call it in to public works staff directly.

5. Computerized Crime Mapping and Analysis -- the geographic analysis of reported crimes and crime patterns using computerized mapping systems.

6. Team Work and Information Sharing -- includes "beat planning" taking place among officers and with the community, as well face-to-face communication between off-going and on-coming officers.

7. CAPS Liaison Program -- a program whereby one officer from each of the districts attends quarterly citywide CAPS meetings and shares that information at the district level.

8. District Administrative Managers -- civilian managers of district administrative affairs.

The second year evaluation of CAPS was focused on empirical data targeted at determining if CAPS made any measurable differences in predefined criteria. This evaluation found substantial decreases in perceived crime problems, a reduction in gang violence, drug dealing, building abandonment and trash in the streets. Additionally, the researchers found that public attitudes toward the police improved significantly. There were more varied results across the City on community involvement in CAPS activities.

The year three evaluation of CAPS focused on implementation of the eight components of the Strategy. Overall, approximately 60% of the districts were found to be satisfactorily or adequately implementing most or all of the eight CAPS program components. However, two problematic areas were observed. First, although communication between police and the community had significantly improved, communication between officers on what was going on in the area saw no change. Second, officers and other police department personnel were found to be only very slowly adapting to the use of computerized mapping of crime data--push pins on maps were still in use in several instances. Other findings in the year three evaluation of CAPS indicate that crime is still the biggest concern among Chicagoans, but greater public awareness of CAPS and optimism about the police offer hope for the future.

A strengthened relationship between police and the community was noted in the evaluation. However, the lessons learned from problem solving at the "lowest level" in community policing have not been translated into a change in philosophy at the police department where systematic planning and problem solving techniques are just beginning to take hold.

Houston, Texas

A. Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART) Pilot Project

In the early and mid 1980s, the City of Houston tried several new approaches to decrease violent crime and the fear of crime in the city. Key among these was the Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART) Pilot Project. This project was implemented at the beginning of 1983 and evaluated at the end of 1984.⁽⁹⁾ DART worked to decentralize many police functions to the neighborhood "command center" level, broaden individual street officer's responsibilities, and integrate citizens at the neighborhood level into the policing process.

The project involved assigning officers to a particular neighborhood and requiring them to conduct "beat profiling." Beat profiling requires that officers learn as much as they can about their assigned beat, that they constantly update that information, that they know who the neighborhood leaders and groups are and what factors are at risk in the area. The objective of the project was to develop community police who knew and worked in cooperation with the neighborhoods they served.

The evaluation of the DART pilot project indicated that the project met several, but not all of its original goals. The project appeared to be successful at 1) shifting the police in the pilot project neighborhoods to a more "service-oriented" style of policing; 2) significantly increasing beat integrity (the proportion of time and calls for service officers have within their geographic areas); and 3) moving some investigative responsibilities to officers on the street. However, the Police Department did not attempt to measure or evaluate changes in perceptions of citizens toward the police because of the program, or the level of citizen involvement in neighborhood crime prevention.

Several types of crimes were analyzed to determine the potential impact of the program. These included homicide, forcible rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny and vehicle theft. Statistically significant reductions in almost all categories of crime were found for the neighborhoods involved in the project compared to the city as a whole and control neighborhoods. The only categories of crime which did not see a statistically significant decrease were forcible rape and some of the subcategories of assault. Notably, those subcategories of assault involving the use of a firearm also saw a statistically significant decline.

Kansas City, Missouri

A. The Kansas City Gun Experiment

The Kansas City Gun Experiment took place from July 7, 1992 to January 27, 1993 in Kansas City, Missouri and was evaluated by researchers from the University of Maryland using a National Institute of Justice grant. The Gun Experiment involved increasing policing patrols in gun crime "hot spots." The "hot spots" identified in Kansas City comprised two separate neighborhoods: 1) a central city residential area--the target area for increased enforcement; and 2) the downtown business district--the control area. Both of these areas experienced a homicide rate that was 20 times the national average. The residential area had a predominantly nonwhite population and of the residents lived in owner-occupied single-family detached homes.

Police patrols were increased through adding six hours of police officer overtime, seven days a week, assigned solely to gun interdiction, for a total of 4,512 police hours.⁽¹⁰⁾ Officers reported spending approximately 25% of their time patrolling in cars and the remainder doing paperwork. The method used for finding illegal guns and illegal possession of a firearm was traffic stops. Officers were specifically trained to identify behaviors that provided reasonable suspicion for a search of the vehicle and/or person.

Officers seized an average of one gun per 28 stops; and an average of 54 patrol officer hours were invested per gun seized. Two-thirds of those carrying these firearms resided outside of the neighborhood. The University of Maryland researchers estimated using a multiple regression analysis that for every gun seized, two gun crimes are prevented by removing those firearms from "circulation." The Kansas City Gun Experiment resulted in a 65% increase in gun seizures in the target area, which also experienced substantial decreases in the numbers of homicides and drive-by shootings. Notably, there was no measurable displacement of gun crime to areas outside the boundaries of the targeted neighborhood. Finally, the Kansas City Gun Experiment did not result in reductions of non-gun crimes.

The University of Maryland researchers reported that the directed patrol employed by the Kansas City Police Department is about three times more cost effective than normal uniformed police activity citywide, on average, in getting guns off the street. They noted that while the raw numbers of guns seized in each beat may not be impressively large, the impact of even small increases in guns seized in decreasing the percentage of gun crimes can be substantial. Finally, these researchers advise that if a city wants to adopt this policy in a high gun crime area, this experiment proves that it can be successfully implemented.

There is reason to believe that all officers assigned to conduct traffic stops could be trained in the techniques in Kansas City to identify situations where there is reasonable suspicion of the presence of a firearm. A review of the study also indicated that the key to Kansas City's success may be simply the increased level of police service in the target area, and that gun seizures are an inevitable result of the increased "attention" to the target area.

Finally, there appears to have been neighborhood support for the Gun Experiment. There were community meetings to discuss this effort, and only a few had criticisms of the Gun Experiment based on the fact that a largely nonwhite neighborhood was selected.⁽¹¹⁾ Most citizens expressed their appreciation for the Gun Experiment's efforts to address the very real problem of guns in their neighborhood.

Los Angeles, California

A. "Saturday Night Special" Sales Ban

The City of Los Angeles recently adopted an ordinance banning the sale of cheaply made guns, which are also known as "junk guns" or "Saturday Night Specials." Specifically, the ordinance bans "second-hand" dealers from selling guns classified as "Saturday Night Specials," which are generally defined as handguns that are poorly made, inaccurate and likely to cause personal injury. The federal government has banned the import of these guns under the Gun Control Act since 1968. The Los Angeles ordinance is modeled after West Hollywood's and it delineates in detail what kinds of pistols or revolvers are to be considered "Saturday Night Specials." The ordinance specifies that the Chief of Police is to publish a list of specific guns classified as "Saturday Night Specials," and send a copy to the gun dealers every six months.

The Los Angeles Police Department indicates that in 1996, 386 of the 9,975 guns confiscated were "Saturday Night Specials." This figure is up from 1995 when 92 of the 11,023 guns confiscated were "Saturday Night Specials." There are no figures available for 1997. Elected officials and the Los Angeles Police Department credit their "zero tolerance" policy toward guns--which the "Saturday Night Special" sales ban is a part of--with the precipitous decrease in the number of gun dealers in the city. Because of city, state and federal legislation aimed at more tightly regulating gun sales, the number of city-licenced gun dealers has dropped from 105 to 91 from 1994 to the present, while the number of federally licenced dealers has dropped from 1,400 to 400.⁽¹²⁾

Other gun violence legislation being considered in Los Angeles includes an ordinance requiring that trigger locks be sold with guns, and an ordinance requiring a licence and background check for the purchase of ammunition.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

A. Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and Safety):

Programming

The Minneapolis strategy for dealing with significant increases in gun violence has been developed from leadership in both the law enforcement and corporate sectors. In June of 1996 the drive-by shooting murder of eleven year-old Bryon Phillips crystalized sentiment in Minneapolis to end gang-related violence. In July, four year-old Davisha Brantley-Gillum was killed in a similar manner in Saint Paul, raising fears that gang violence was now escalating in the Capital City as well. It was also reported that at about the same time, the heads of three Minneapolis corporations went to the governor, hinting that crime could force them, along with their thousands of jobs and millions of tax dollars, to leave the city.⁽¹³⁾ That meeting and a whirlwind of others led to the launching of the new plan to combat violent crime by focusing on certain gangs in certain neighborhoods, letting probation officers patrol with police officers, starting a new level of cooperation between federal and local agencies, and expanding job and recreation alternatives for urban youth. These efforts along with others formed what has become known as the Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and Safety) campaign.

Minnesota HEALS efforts arise out of the partnership of local, state and federal law enforcement, corporations, social service agencies, community organizations and the City of Minneapolis. Activities undertaken this summer include:⁽¹⁴⁾

Youth Activities:

Expanded hours for the "What's Up?" telephone line which provides information about job and recreational opportunities;

Two additional sites for the "Phat Summer" program of sports, concerts, etc.;

Additional recreation programs at ten parks;

1,500 youth summer jobs (double last year's level);

Twenty youth neighborhood clean-up jobs funded by private companies; and

Pre-apprenticeship trade program for youth.

Law Enforcement Activities:

Full staffing of police department--all vacancies filled as of June 19, 1997;

Six officers added to gang strike force within police department, bringing staff level to 16;

Reactivation of vice unit within police department;

Requirement that investigators walk a beat twice a month;

New partnership of probation and police officers to monitor 12-24 offenders;

New partnership of federal and local law enforcement to trace guns and prosecute gang members; and

More aggressive enforcement of curfew ordinances for juveniles.

B. Minnesota HEALS Homicide Study

In addition to undertaking these activities, the Minnesota HEALS sponsored a study of Minneapolis homicides to determine what could be learned about the dramatic increase in the number of homicides over the last several years.⁽¹⁵⁾ This research was compiled by David Kennedy and Anthony Brage, Harvard University researchers, working with the national Police Executive Research Forum, and funded by Honeywell. They examined the 264 homicides that occurred in Minneapolis between January 1, 1994 and May 24, 1997. Some of their research findings are summarized below:

Guns were used in two-thirds of the killings overall and in more than 90% of the gang-related killings;

Gang activity was the biggest single reason behind the increase in homicides. Nearly 45% of the 264 killings studies were gang-related, even though only 3.5% of the city's youth are thought to be active in gangs;

Most homicide victims and suspects are minorities, especially African-American;

Both victims and offenders tend to have arrest histories, and often substantial ones--more than 40% of victims and almost 75% of suspects had arrest histories, while nearly one-fourth of the victims and one-third of the suspects had probation histories; and

Homicides tend to cluster in a few Minneapolis neighborhoods.

The Harvard study confirms three important theories that many people had been using. First, it affirmed the connection of the presence of gangs and guns with the increase in homicides. Minneapolis officials have indicated that the study "reinforces the theory that focusing on gangs is the way to stop crime."⁽¹⁶⁾ Second, it affirmed that Boston's practice of pairing probation officers with police officers is appropriate giving the high rate of victimization and repeat offenders within the "probation population." Earlier this summer, the Minneapolis Police Department's 16 gang investigators paired up with Hennepin County probation officers to make sure that 12 to 24 selected offenders--many of them hard-core gang members--stay out of trouble.⁽¹⁷⁾ The study also makes clear that homicides tend to occur in specific areas or neighborhoods within the city. Therefore, geographically targeting intervention efforts, as is done in Kansas City, may be appropriate. Lastly, the study aptly points out that not all homicide in Minneapolis is gang homicide, and work should continue on strategies for addressing non-gang violence, especially domestic and drug-related violence. However, they state that "gang homicide is the largest single component of the city's homicide problem. Addressing gang violence is thus an appropriate first step."⁽¹⁸⁾

New York City, New York

Perhaps no city has had the tremendous success New York has experienced in lowering the levels of violent crime. Between 1993 and 1996, murder dropped 49% and auto theft 47%. Serious crimes as measured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation dropped 3% across the country in the first six months of 1996, compared with 1995. In New York City, the drop was 10.5%, according to the FBI. Even Brooklyn North, with its reputation as a high crime area within New York City has seen violent crime drop off significantly: in 1993 there were 126 homicides in the area and in 1995 there were 44. Indeed, the drop in violent crime in New York has had the effect of noticeably lowering the nation's crime rates.

During the same period of time that these decreases in violent were taking place, the New York City Police Department was undertaking significant changes in terms of its policing strategy. In brief, the department had begun community policy efforts, increased foot patrols and undertaken to regularly arrest people for relatively minor infractions such as public drinking, truancy and panhandling.

The remarkable decreases in New York City's crime rates have been the subject of contentious discussions in criminology and police circles. There are three schools of thought on this issue: the first attributes the drop in crime to new police strategy. The second attributes these declines to an improved economy, a "stabilization" of the crack cocaine market, and other socio-economic trends. The third school of thought interprets the drops through the lens of epidemiological theory.⁽¹⁹⁾ Using this approach, crime is viewed as a disease that does not have a single cure, but many aspects of cures that are necessary. It is impossible to know which program, police effort or economic trend turned things around. However, a critical mass was reached a dramatic drop in crime resulted. This is in contrast to most of our thinking that says: add a dollar, crime drops X%. Epidemiological theory says: add a dollar, crime may drop a tiny amount, add another dollar, crime may drop a little more, add yet another dollar and eventually you have added enough to tip the scales--and crime rates will drop dramatically. The following discussion of New York City's crime prevention strategy focuses primarily on the efforts undertaken by the city, rather than broader socio-economic trends.

A. Community Policing in New York

Community policing "New York-Style" has brought about several significant changes to the policing methods of that city. First, policing philosophy is changing, albeit slowly, to view the police as working in partnership with the community to prevent crime and enforce laws. Relatedly, foot patrols have been increased significantly and high crime areas are the focus of increased police attention. Finally, New York has begun regularly arresting for minor infractions. Each of the changes is discussed in more detail below.

Minor infraction arrests began in New York City in April of 1990 in the subway system as the Transit Police implemented this policy under the leadership of Chief William Bratton--who later became the New York City Police Chief. The "lower level" of crimes of concern in the subway system were fare-beating, disorder and robbery. The success of this new tactic has been outstanding. Felonies in the subway system are down 80% since 1990. One arrestee out of seven either had an outstanding warrant for a felony charge or was carrying an illegal weapon.⁽²⁰⁾ The subway experience provided the "blueprint for restoring order on the streets of New York"⁽²¹⁾ as the City's Mayor Giuliani embraced the policy of minor infraction arresting and hired Bratton.

The logical underpinning of the "minor infraction arrest" concept is the "broken window theory." This theory was put forward by criminologists James Q Wilson and George L. Kelling in a 1982 Atlantic Monthly article. They argued that broken windows in a neighborhood convey the message that nobody is in charge. The sense of disorder becomes an invitation to delinquents to break more windows, causes citizens to abandon streets and eventually leads to serious crimes. "The notion is if you affect signs of crime and disorder, people feel more comfortable about using public spaces, and the opportunity for crime is less," says New York Deputy Police Commissioner Michael Farrell. The other dividend, he says, is a reduction in serious crimes. Stopping someone for a minor offense like aggressive panhandling or public drinking allows police to check outstanding warrants for other crimes, to frisk the individual and confiscate illegal guns.⁽²²⁾

Using the broken window theory, the New York City Police Department has moved to focus its efforts the high crime areas within the city, thus focusing their resources where they are needed most. In order to identify the key areas to focus enforcement,

the police have employed a computerized mapping system (a geographic information system known as Compstat). This system shows precinct commanders when and where crimes are occurring almost instantaneously, thus providing key information on where officers should be deployed, not just to handle the incident at hand, but to be a presence to prevent future possible crimes. "The Police Department credits its strategy of saturating specific high crime neighborhoods with police officers as another reason for sharp crime drops in neighborhoods like drug-infested Washington Heights, north of Harlem."⁽²³⁾

The New York Police Department has also returned to the use of foot patrols to augment police car presence in the city's neighborhoods. This is considered to be another key aspect of community policing "New York Style." The department argues that foot patrols radically reduce fear of crime, as well as prevent many "quality of life" crimes, such as public drinking and panhandling, from occurring.

Additionally, the New York Police Department has moved to concentrate police presence in hours when they are needed most. This is understood to be as critical as focusing on the high crime areas of the city. Using the Compstat system which also tracks the time crimes occur, police commanders argued that their old staffing patterns needed to change to reflect the times when crimes actually occur. Their old system provided for equally staffed rotations.

Perhaps as a result of New York City trying to move toward more community policing, there have been reports of possible displacement of crime that otherwise may have occurred in New York City. According to Norman Siegel, executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, the homeless have simply moved to less visible parts of the city, where police are less likely to hassle them. A recent New York Times account described homeless people who now sleep at the New Jersey end of the Lincoln Tunnel. Squeegee cleaners and panhandlers, who have dwindled markedly in Manhattan, now approach commuters in Newark.⁽²⁴⁾

B. Study of Homicides in New York

One of the key accomplishments of the Minnesota HEALS (Health, Education And Law and Safety) program is the completion of the profiling the murders in Minneapolis over almost a three and a half year time period, ending in late May of this year. A similar study of New York City homicides was conducted for the years 1990 and 1991.⁽²⁵⁾ Approximately 4,500 homicides were reviewed in the development of this study. The following are some of the findings of the research:

Most homicides (50%) take place on the streets and other outdoor places, followed by the victims' homes (19%).

Firearms were the cause of death for 80% of the homicides on the streets or other outdoor spaces, and 50% of the homicides in the home.

86% of homicide victims were male, and 33% of the homicides in the home were female.

86% of homicide victims were African American or Latino, compared to 49% of the city's population (of a 7 million population: 43% white, 25% African American, 24% Latino, and 8% other racial groups).

67% of homicide victims were ages 15-34, compared to 33% of the city's population.

Approximately 55% of the homicides on the streets had evidence of cocaine or ethanol present, compared to 44% of those in the home.

As is the case for the Minnesota HEALS research, this study indicates where programming efforts are required. Even though the studies looked at somewhat different types of information, there are some important parallels. First, the role of firearms in homicides: of Minneapolis homicides, and 80% of the street and 50% of the home homicides in New York City. Second, the age and race of the victims: primarily young, male and minority. Although the Minneapolis study did not specifically discuss the presence/influence of drugs and alcohol, national statistics indicate that roughly of killers or victims are drinking at the time of the homicide; and one-fourth of victims test positive for other drugs.⁽²⁶⁾ The New York study did not cover the topic of gang affiliation or the arrest and probation record of victims or perpetrators. However, the Minneapolis study indicated that 45% of the homicides examined were gang-related. Overall, these findings reinforce the contention that the combination of guns, gangs and drugs combine to create violence.

Oakland, California

A. Regional Gun Regulation Efforts

A series of gun violence incidents and increasing gun crime spurred a conference on gun violence prevention in July of 1996 in the east San Francisco Bay area. Between 1991 and 1993 six out of every eight homicides in Alameda County (in which Oakland is located) involved a firearm, which is about 15% higher than the national average. The group that worked to develop the conference and increase local gun violence prevention efforts included fifteen cities in the east San Francisco Bay area, the counties, school districts and law enforcement agencies. It was their belief that a regional effort was needed to stop the violence that spills from one jurisdiction to another. Additionally, many at the conference voiced concern over the lack of assistance they have received from the federal and state levels in achieving legislative solutions.⁽²⁷⁾ In their efforts to reduce gun violence through legislation, each city has introduced (and most have passed) a package of ordinances addressing the following issues:⁽²⁸⁾

Regulation of Gun Sales -- this has passed in almost all of the east San Francisco Bay area cities, as well as in San Francisco;

Trigger Locks Required at the Point of Sale -- this has passed in several of the east San Francisco Bay area cities, and is being considered in most of the others;

Conditional Use Permits Required to Open a Gun Store -- this has passed in almost all of the east San Francisco Bay area cities, as well as in San Francisco;

Ban on Junk Guns/Saturday Night Specials -- this has passed in many of the east San Francisco Bay area cities, as well as in San Francisco;

Safety Training Required for First-Time Gun Buyers; -- this has passed in one of the east San Francisco Bay area cities, and is being considered in a few others; and

Gross receipts tax on gun dealers -- this passed in Oakland and is being discussed in several other cities of the east San Francisco Bay area cities.

Finally, the local governments in this region check their gun dealers for compliance with state and local regulations. The county of Contra Costa in California found that of the 661 federally licensed dealers, 71.6% were operating in residentially zoned areas, and 81.5% operated without a business license. Supervising compliance of gun dealers often leads to a decrease in the number of gun dealers, thus limiting the number of sources of guns.⁽²⁹⁾

B. Youth ALIVE! -- Gun Shot Victim Counseling

In the past four years, Children's Hospital in Oakland, which serves much of Northern California, has seen a 200% increase in the number of children under 14 with gunshot injuries. Additionally, 20% of patients nationally treated for trauma due to violence will be dead within 5 years, and estimated 44% of patients treated for trauma due to violence will eventually be back in the hospital for the same reason. These facts combined to motivate a group of doctors and gun violence survivors to begin talking to gun violence patients about how to prevent this violence from happening to them again. Gun shot survivors begin meeting with these trauma patients while they are still in the hospital. Doctors observed that often the hospital stays simply provided the patients with time to plan retribution, intervening at this juncture, therefore, was critical. One Youth ALIVE! counselor describes the situation this way:

A desire to get even is kind of like the natural response. And even if it's not, your friends and family members are often coming to put that idea on you . So we talk to patients about how futile it would be to try to get revenge. How it would just ruin another life and not really help you to change the situation that you're in now. It's kind of like a tug-of-war, pitting this new friend, whose suggesting revenge would be harmful, against the friends you've grown up with telling you it's something you have to do. Hopefully we can get through.⁽³⁰⁾

There is an evaluation of this program in progress.

Phoenix, Arizona

A. Anti-Crime Program Organization

The City of Phoenix distributes its crime prevention funds through a single office which conducts ongoing evaluations of crime prevention efforts. This office requires that each applicant for funds establish clear measurable objectives, and that they have a plan for the evaluation of their success or failure. In some cases, programs can measure change resulting from their activities in terms decreases in shots fired, decreases in burglary or other objective indicators. In other cases, programs conduct pre- and post- surveys in order to determine changes in neighborhood perception of crime or changes in program participant attitudes, etc. City staff work with the programs to determine appropriate measures and monitor the success of program efforts. Finally, City staff make determinations about the types of programs that have not worked in the past and therefore need to be cut from the budget and replaced with other efforts.

B. Anti-Graffiti Program⁽³¹⁾

The anti-graffiti program that Phoenix has initiated is four-fold: a graffiti hotline, clean-up crews, decreased juvenile access to spray paint and criminal prosecution of those in violation of the graffiti ordinance. The City of Phoenix has stepped-up their activities in the last year in all of these areas, and has experienced some success in their efforts.

The graffiti hotline is available for citizens to report instances of graffiti. The hotline also offers cash rewards--sponsored by a non-profit community group, the Phoenix Community Alliance--for callers who provide information leading to the arrest or parental intervention of graffiti and tagging vandals. Calls to this hotline have decreased about 50% in 1996-97 from 1995-96. Staff attribute this to two factors: proactive city clean-up of graffiti and discouraged graffiti and tagging vandals due to more intense enforcement scrutiny of their activities.

The second component of the Phoenix program is known as "Graffiti Busters." They are clean-up crews who quickly respond to citizens calls and remove graffiti. "Graffiti Busters" was expanded late in 1995 from a citizen complaint-driven program to one which also proactively removes graffiti anywhere in the city. This action more than doubled the number of graffiti sites cleaned-up (4,000 to 8,700) from the first half of 1996 to the first half of 1997. Staff attribute this improvement to their own increase in efficiency resulting from less travel time and more efficient and effective crews and equipment.

In 1995 Phoenix expanded its graffiti ordinance to require businesses to keep aerosol spray paint containers and indelible markers in either a location that requires employee assistance, or in a locked storage area. Compliance with this ordinance is reported to be high and no citations were issued to businesses in 1996.

Lastly, there is increased prosecution of violators of the graffiti ordinance, and stiffer sentences for offenders. Prosecution was turned over from the city attorney's office where the cases were heard in municipal court, to the county attorney where the cases are heard in district court. Overall, the number of graffiti cases filed has declined approximately 60% in the year since this transition. However, the sentences issued by the court have increased substantially. Average community service hours have increased from 50 to 62, and over 90% of those found guilty were assigned community service. Average jail time has increased from 1.4 days to 7.2 days. Jail time was previously assigned in 26% of cases and 66% of cases so far in 1997 were assigned jail time.

C. Block Watchers on Patrol

This program entails members of the community, identified as Block Watchers by t-shirts and badges, patrolling the streets of their own neighborhood. The Block Watchers act as a visible deterrent to crime. Participants are screened for criminal history, and go through a training program with policemen. Cellular phones and scanners are available at the police station for Block Watchers to check out for use on their patrol.

D. Operation Safe Street

Operation Safe Street is mainly a police initiative, aimed at providing police with increased information specifically concerning gang activity. The program includes police identifying and tracking gang members, gang crime data, and the members' criminal histories, as well as tracking repeat gang offenders. The program offers education for police on gangs. While the incidence of gang-related violent crime since this program started has remained unchanged, the gang-related homicide rate dropped from 11 deaths to 4.

E. Police Officers on Campus

This program installs a police officer in public schools to deal with truancy, drug and violence issues at the school. The schools report that it has been found that having a police officer on campus has reduced truancy and criminal acts significantly. It is a popular program in which many schools wish to be included.

Seattle, Washington

A. Seattle Gun Buy-Back Program

Gun buy-back programs have been a popular means of disposing of guns that may, at some point, be used in a violent crime or accidentally. The City of Seattle has participated in two such programs in the 1990s. Seattle's gun buy-back program conducted in the fall of 1992 was evaluated to determine its impact in reducing gun crimes by researchers from the Harborview Injury Prevention and Research Center (located in Seattle), the University of Washington Medical School and the University of Rochester Medical School (located in Rochester, New York).⁽³²⁾ The Seattle Gun Buy-Back program provided $50 cash to each person turning in guns, regardless of the number of guns they had.

The researches analyzed police department and emergency room statistics on gun violence for both the years preceding and following the gun-back program. They also surveyed participants in the program and conducted a random telephone survey of Seattle residents. They found that the majority of people turning in guns through the program were men (75%), the average age was 51, and only 2.4% were minors. The vast majority of guns turned in to the program were handguns (95%) and were reported to be operational. Interestingly, 66% of participants retained ownership of firearms other than those exchanged for $50. Approximately 2% of the guns collected had been reported as stolen according to the tracing data of these firearms from the National Crime Information Center at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

According to all the data the researchers analyzed, the Seattle Gun Buy-Back Program resulted in no measurable impact in gun violence crimes, injuries or fatalities. These findings are consistent with anecdotal information from other cities.⁽³³⁾ However, the random telephone survey of Seattle residents showed a high level of support for the program.

B. The Options, Choices and Consequences Program

Options, Choices and Consequences is a 1 ‡ year-old program targeted at Seattle's eighth and ninth grade students. The program involves two one-hour sessions where students learn the medical and legal consequences of using guns. Local trauma unit physicians describe the reality of gun-shot injuries--one in five gun shot victims die, while the majority of the rest have serious long-term ongoing medical problems resulting from their injuries. Police officers and attorneys describe the criminal charges applied to juveniles possessing and using firearms. The students are led through several scenarios where situations involving youth and guns are described, and alternatives to gun possession and usage are explored. There are no reports or evaluations of this program. Notably, there is evidence that short-term, "one-shot" intervention and prevention efforts are less effective than ongoing programming. Oklahoma City, Virginia Beach and Phoenix are considering adopting this program.

C. Trigger-Locks and Lock Boxes

The Seattle Police Department conducted a study of local gun-owners to determine the level of safety measures in place in the homes of gun-owning city residents. Disputes between persons who are family members or intimates are 23 times more likely to result in death if a firearm is present at the scene.⁽³⁴⁾ They found that most gun-owners did not use trigger locks or lock boxes. Seattle hardware stores are providing trigger-locks at cost for all purchasers. The City of Seattle has purchased a large number of trigger locks for give-away.

The Seattle Police Department is partnering with the Harborview Injury Prevention and Research Center (located in Seattle) and Fred Meyer (a discount department store chain in the Seattle area) on a "Safe Storage" campaign. Lock boxes provide safe storage for firearms and help to prevent their accidental use in the home. The lock boxes are being provided below cost by Fred Meyer.

Washington, D.C.

A. The Shock Mentor Program

The shock mentor program involves mentors accompanying high-risk youths during trips to a local hospital emergency.